operably linked to heterologous structural gene sequences that function in crop plant cells. The '258 patent does not expire until December 15, 2020 .
At least as important as intellectual property (IP) rights are the regulatory approvals in various countries that allow for the production, import or sale of the original patent-protected biotech product. A key question is how these approvals will apply to generic versions of a product or to similar products that incorporate some of the previously patented components.
There are vast disparities in regulatory regimes for genetically engineered or modified (GM) crops. In the United States, once a gene inserted into a crop has been deregulated, the gene may be grown in that crop indefinitely 11 . In contrast, most other countries require regulatory approvals for GM crops to be periodically renewed. This period varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction-in China, applications must be submitted every three years, in Korea every five, and in Japan and Europe every ten. Additionally, the regulatory frameworks in major jurisdictions may change. For instance, GM crops are currently approved at the European level; however, beginning in 2015, individual EU countries have the authority to limit cultivation of GM crops, even when the EU's central regulators declare them safe 12 .
Companies have incentive to remain in control of regulatory filings, even for offpatent products. In many situations, regulatory approvals can prove to be a source of market exclusivity. The more costly and complex the regulatory process is, the greater the barrier to entry it poses to competing products. Moreover, the obstacle posed by regulatory requirements can consolidate the exclusivity created by patents and other forms of IP. Together they form an IP-regulatory rules complex that companies use to gain and maintain competitive advantage 13 .
The emergence of agbiogenerics
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Although the first major agbiotech product patent has expired, regulatory requirements could continue to allot a significant degree of control to the original right holder. Monsanto may no longer bring infringement claims for this technology against others to prevent them from growing, selling, exporting or importing soybeans with the RR1 event in the United States. Additionally, growers will gain the ability to save RR1 soybean seeds for planting in the next season. Patents covering other crops with the RR1 trait, such as canola, likewise expire in the near future, at which point the RR1 event will also become generic for these crops [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
Yet, Monsanto has already introduced a second version of its herbicide resistant technology, called Roundup Ready 2 Yield (RR2Y), calculating that many farmers will upgrade. Indeed, 50 million acres of the RR2Y trait have already been planted since its launch in 2009 (ref. 1). However, as the agbiotech sector matures and foundational patents reach the end of their terms, a new competitive landscape of generic genetically engineered agricultural products, or agbiogenerics, could emerge.
Seed companies and public sector breeding programs, together with regulators both in the United States and abroad, are poised to learn from the case of the RR1 event, which elucidates key challenges that generic biotech products will face. How industry and regulators respond will profoundly shape how agbiogenerics will be deployed in agriculture worldwide.
Characteristics of the IP and regulatory landscapes for RR1 soybeans Monsanto's RR1 soybean technology was protected by a number of overlapping patents ( Table 1 The next-generation RR2Y soybean (event MON89788) consists of very different technologies, protected by a new and distinct set of patents. RR2Y includes a chimeric promoter, consisting of enhancer elements of the FMV35S and the Arabidopsis TSF1 promoter and intron, resulting in optimized expression of the EPSPS trait 10 . New constructs and plants containing this RR2Y trait are protected by an updated patent portfolio including, for example, US 6,462,258, which claims a DNA construct comprising Arabidopsis actin (Act) promoter sequences, as well as fragments and cis elements derived from these promoters p aT e n T s npg a particular characteristic. Therefore, although the RR1 trait is essentially the same across all applications, the regulatory system approves the trait on a species-by-species basis.
Nevertheless, transgenic glyphosate tolerance has already been developed for a number of crops ( Table 3) . With RR1 in the public domain, incorporating this trait into specialty crops such as blueberries, raspberries and others may become commercially feasible due to the elimination of license fees 17 . Alternatively, development of the RR1 or other agbiogeneric traits in species other than the one initially regulated may remain prohibitive due to regulatory costs. These questions are most salient for public sector breeding institutions that seek to incorporate agbiogeneric traits into new varieties they are responsible for developing, Significance of agbiogeneric traits: RR1 in soybeans and lessons for other crops The complexity of the IP and regulatory issues surrounding agbiogenerics is daunting, and the economic importance of these technologies commands attention. The formidable market value of agbiogenerics is revealed by the share of cropping area on which farmers choose to plant GM varieties. In the United States in 2014, 94% of the total soybean acreage, 91% percent of cotton and 89% percent of corn were devoted to GM crops with herbicidetolerant traits, up from 68%, 56% and less than 10%, respectively, in 2001 (ref. 14) . Globally, in 2014 biotech plantings covered more than 1.8 billion hectares 15 . Among these, 79% of global soybean hectares, 70% of cotton, 32% of maize and 24% of rapeseed were GM. As of late 2014, a total of 28 countries-20 of which were developing economies-planted biotech crops, with over 60% of the world's population living in those 28 countries.
Since the early 1990s a range of crops, including soybeans, canola, cotton, maize, sugarbeet and alfalfa, has been developed, with transgenic traits conferring tolerance to a number of different herbicides-including dicamba, glufosinate, imidazolinone, phosphinothricin and glyphosate. Commercially, the most successful trait, by far, conferred by the gene encoding EPSPS, has been resistance to glyphosate, the main ingredient in the herbicide trademarked by Monsanto as Roundup. Glyphosate-tolerant soybeans containing the RR1 event currently account for about 60% of global production of soybean ( Notwithstanding the impact that glyphosate-tolerance has had on global soybean cultivation, the technology's potential may not be fully realized. Under patent protection, commercialization has been confined to a handful of large-acreage crops. This previously included soybean, and is still the case for corn and canola. Meanwhile, crops such as alfalfa and sugar beet were subject to prolonged regulatory battles. With IP constraints removed, the basic economic calculus that drove the political outcomes of those regulatory battles will likely evolve.
The RR1 event might now be incorporated into many other crops, including those whose markets had been considered too small to be commercially profitable. However, even if IP rights no longer constrain R&D for the RR1 event in other crops, regulatory barriers still might. Regulatory regimes for biotech crops in the United States and internationally are currently based on events rather than traits. The term 'event' refers to specific transgenic insertions into a host genome, while the term 'trait' broadly refers to the genotype associated with Agbiogenerics for public sector breeding institutions Even before the expiration of the last RR1-related patent, precedent emerged for public sector development of a soybean variety containing the RR1 event. In December 2014, the University of Arkansas released UA 5414RR, featuring Monsanto's technology 18 . Although RR1 patents were still in force at the time of release, Monsanto had previously elected to share its breeding material with public programs. According to university representatives, the development of UA 5414RR was designed for growers who want to use the Roundup system for weed control but who are not willing or able to pay the premium for the secondgeneration RR2Y product. Nathan McKinney, assistant director of the Arkansas Agricultural Experiment Station, has noted that public sector breeding programs are likely to respond to the emergence of the generic RR1 event by introducing new varieties including the trait where there is both market demand and the possibility of public benefit 19 . Thus, universities and governmental institutions could begin to breed improved varieties of 'orphan' crops or focus on developing new varieties adapted to local needs that would incorporate the RR1 trait. Indeed, one of the advantages of UA 5414RR is that it is adapted to growing conditions in Arkansas.
The problem of regulatory approvals in multiple jurisdictions and a potential solution In countries that permit them, GM crops must still obtain the approval of national regulatory agencies to be allowed into the field or onto the market. Moreover, in territories where periodic renewal is required, there can be a fundamental problem once a technology is off patent. No single entity-neither the original owner, nor a new agbiogeneric entrant-may have sufficient economic incentive to bear the costs of maintaining approvals in all relevant growing and importing markets around the world 20, 21 .
For the RR1 soybean event, Monsanto made a commitment to maintain all regulatory approvals until 2021, initially as an ad hoc response to a phenomenon that the industry had not previously encountered. However, industry associations and major seed companies have subsequently united to establish a voluntary framework for maintaining regulatory approvals for all future agbiogenerics.
The AgAccord, the culmination of several years of negotiations led by the American Seed Trade Association and the Biotechnology Industry Organization, is a "private-sector driven mechanism that provides for the transition of regulatory and stewardship responsibilities for biotech events after patent expiration, " and comprises two separate agreements 22 . These include the Generic Event Marketability and Access Agreement (GEMAA), a protocol to manage patent expiration, and the Data Use and Compensation Agreement (DUCA), which includes procedures to manage access to regulatory data.
The GEMAA is a binding agreement between "holders of proprietary regulatory information that supports the authorizations for biotech events in jurisdictions worldwide" 23 . Accession to the GEMAA is voluntary among proprietary data owners-essentially companies like Monsanto. However, once they join the AgAccord, signatories commit to provide notice of patent expiration three years before the last patent on a biotech event expires, and then to provide access to the technology upon expiration. When the final relevant patent expires, the company has three options: (i) independently maintain authorizations; (ii) share regulatory responsibility with other GEMAA signatories; or (iii) give notice of discontinuation of the technology (yet, continuing to maintain regulatory clearance for seven years after giving such notice).
Essentially, "GEMAA requires a patent holder to choose between maintaining their proprietary data but fully bearing the costs of their competitors' market entry, or sharing the costs but also the data with their competitors" 24 . GEMAA signatories are entitled to receive a biological copy of a genetic event when the last patent expires, essentially providing all parties with the breeding material necessary to develop new crop varieties with the generic trait. In other words, GEMAA creates freedom to operate for its signatories, by reducing IP and regulatory barriers to entry in the generic market.
Despite its benefits, GEMAA has been criticized as an inadequate solution. To date, there are only ten signatories, all of which are large seed companies or their trade associations. Some have argued that farmers, smaller seed developers and public sector breeders such as land grant universities have been left out, because GEMAA's terms entail commitment to a perpetual expense in maintaining regulatory clearance. Additionally, smaller breeders might find it impossible to become 'verified' GEMAA members if they are unable to demonstrate that they have sufficient funds to maintain regulatory clearance for the requisite seven-year period. Verified members may take advantage of an inside track in gaining proprietary data under a regulatory responsibility-sharing plan.
For its part, the DUCA enumerates guidelines surrounding (i) access to information about pending patent expiration of covered events; (ii) access to proprietary data and the generic event at patent expiration; (iii) maintenance of authorizations for generic events; (iv) commitments to product stewardship; (v) allocation of regulatory and maintenance costs; and (vi) a "clear and predictable path" for signatories to exit the marketplace, should they decide to do so. DUCA also provides a mechanism for compensation in return for access to proprietary data. Under DUCA, access to data is mandatory, which renders its terms stronger than GEMAA's. Finally, DUCA's "unified data management system" has been touted as particularly beneficial, because stacked seeds often contain genetic events owned by multiple parties 25 .
Despite its theoretical benefits, DUCA has also been criticized. Critics have alleged that, because DUCA does not require signatories to provide access to the genetic event before patent expiration or oblige parties to accept any reasonable offer for data compensation, the right holder could dominate the party seeking access to data 25 . Furthermore, in order to accede to DUCA, a signatory must create a "verification fund" whose scope will depend on the estimated cost of continued maintenance of international regulation authorizations. Yet, the size of that fund does not factor in the signatory's identity or ability to pay. This could effectively bar public research institutions, small companies or sole proprietorships from participating in the process that DUCA envisions.
DUCA is currently open for signature, and it will not become effective until it locates three signatories who are not holders of proprietary data (e.g., public sector breeding institutions) and three other signatories who are either proprietary data rights holders or petitioners of the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) for the deregulation of a particular genetic event 26 . It is therefore difficult to evaluate whether the AgAccord-GEMAA and DUCA taken together-will represent an adequate answer to the looming questions of maintaining regulatory approvals for agbiogenerics.
A legislated alternative?
As an alternative, some have called for government intervention vis-à-vis national legislation in the United States akin to the Hatch-Waxman Act, which governs the development of generic small-molecule drugs. Among HatchWaxman's provisions is one that allows for proprietary data that had been submitted in support of an application for approval of a branded drug to be liberated to support the application of a follow-on generic, presuming it is sufficiently 'similar' to the original drug to PAT E N T S npg regulatory approvals, companies that formerly exercised patent rights over biotechnologies could continue to monopolize markets by virtue of their control over proprietary data and the use of that data in maintaining regulatory approvals.
Given its international scope, even if the AgAccord is not a perfect framework, it likely entails a better solution than legislation confined to a single jurisdiction. There is a danger that the AgAccord will remain an industrycentric solution. However, public sector breeding institutions could sign and take advantage of the AgAccord, making it possible to establish agbiogeneric platform technologies, like herbicide tolerance, onto which public sector and commercial competitors alike could stack their own events.
The first step will be to educate the scientists and administrators of these public sector institutions about the existence of the AgAccord and its implications. Notably, senior administrators at the University of Arkansas have indicated that they are not familiar with the AgAccord, even though that university is the only US institution that has released a new soybean variety containing the generic RR1 event 19 . Indeed, awareness must be raised about the multifarious issues surrounding agbiogenerics. For instance, the increasing proliferation of weeds that have developed resistance to Roundup threatens the utility of the RR1 gene, in both soybeans and other species, which could be exacerbated by the broadened availability of a generic Roundup Ready trait.
Whatever the solution to the quandaries posed by agbiogenerics, it is clear that they exhibit equivalent safety and efficacy. In effect, the original company's proprietary regulatory data are made public, allowing follow-on generic manufacturers to bypass expensive (and wastefully duplicative) clinical trials.
Another key component of Hatch-Waxman is its safe harbor, which protects precommercial activities reasonably related to the development of follow-on generics against patent infringement 27 . This gives developers of follow-on generics crucial lead time, so that a generic product is ready to enter the market as soon as the patent expires, rather than having to wait up to several years to undergo the R&D and regulatory approvals process.
Similar proposals for follow-on agbiogenerics have been articulated, including streamlined approaches for using pre-existing regulatory data 24 and a safe harbor for precommercial R&D activities related to the creation of agbiogeneric products 25 . Yet, prior efforts to create a streamlined pathway for biotherapeutics have been plagued by the difficulty of defining equivalency between an original biotherapeutic and a follow-on biosimilar, given the complexity of large biomolecules and their dependence for production upon living systems. Such issues would likewise need to be resolved for transgenic crops.
Because transgenic events are individually approved for commercial use, any future soybean varieties conventionally bred to incorporate the RR1 event will already be covered-they will effectively be biosimilars. On the other hand, if a breeder generated a new transgenic event using off-patent genetic components, or if the generic event were incorporated into a species other than the one that was initially deregulated, this event would be required to go through the approvals process. For this reason, some breeders have recommended that regulatory systems be reformed to focus on particular genetic traits, rather than events 28 .
The greatest degree of uncertainty arises when an already approved yet off-patent event is stacked with another transgenic trait. Such 'stacks' would presumably need to be considered by regulators on a case-by-case basis, depending upon how the transgenes are stacked, in which species, and whether or not they interact. In these situations, the original proprietary regulatory data could help to expedite the review and approval of the new transgenic variety.
Yet, even if a statute similar to Hatch-Waxman were enacted and enforced for transgenic crops, its jurisdiction would be limited to the United States. Any legislative solution enacted in the United States alone will not ensure the maintenance of regulatory approvals in other countries. However, maintenance of international regulations and avoidance of trade disruptions are central concerns for the incipient agbiogenerics industry.
Conclusions
The emergence of agbiogenerics implicates a thicket of complex legal and regulatory issues that have the potential to affect the development of new crop varieties and their introduction to markets worldwide. RR1 soybeans represent a pioneering case; GM traits in other major field crops will come off patent in the near future. Without a predictable-and globally applicable-solution to the maintenance of PAT E N T S npg offer an opportunity for public research institutions and universities to remain relevant and competitive in a declining funding environment. The University of Arkansas notes that "we are mindful that competition makes us all better and [we] welcome competition, be it public or private" 19 . Access to agbiogeneric traits can bestow competitive advantage by offering new cultivars for minor or emerging crops or specialty markets, where the private sector is unlikely to invest, while simultaneously fostering R&D for humanitarian ends.
